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Validity of Post-Employment
Non-Compete Covenants in Broadcast
News Employment Contracts
by JON H. SYLVESTER*
Introduction
A post-employment non-compete covenant is an agreement
by an employee that, after termination of employment, the
employee will not compete with the former employer-usually
within a specified geographic area and for a specified period of
time. These agreements raise significant questions of law and
policy involving the confrontation between employees' inter-
ests in freedom to earn a livelihood and employers' interests
in protecting their businesses by limiting the former em-
ployee's post-employment opportunities.1 Ironically, both of
these interests are generally thought to be protected by free-
dom of contract, which is one reason this confrontation is re-
ceiving increasing attention as post-employment non-compete
covenants become a standard part of many employment
contracts.2
Broadcast news is a highly competitive field featuring sub-
jective employment criteria, poor job security, and high turn-
over. In this context, effective post-employment restrictions
can be especially significant.3 The news broadcaster whose
* The author, formerly a professional broadcast journalist, is a graduate of the
Harvard Law School and an Associate Professor of Law at Texas Southern Univer-
sity in Houston.
1. Kniffin, Employee Non-Competition Covenants: The Perils of Performing
Unique Services, 10 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 25 (1978).
2. Closius & Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial En-
forcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A Proposal for Reform, 57 S.
CAL. L. REv. 531, 532 (1984).
3. Most of the issues discussed in the broadcast news industry arise in connec-
tion with various types of personal services contracts. However, the relatively high
salaries and subjective employment criteria that prevail in broadcast news give rise
to certain specific difficulties shared with other performance-related employment,
such as professional sports. This Article focuses upon broadcast news employment
contracts, but makes extensive use of other public performance cases in developing
the applicable principles.
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employment contract has expired or who has been terminated
may face limited and unappealing choices: relocate, change
professions, or sit idle.
This Article discusses whether, and to what extent, a broad-
cast news employee may be bound by a contractual provision
that purportedly relinquishes his right to contract subse-
quently for other employment. Specifically, this Article dis-
cusses the applicable law of selected jurisdictions,4 critiques
the rationale most often used in defending these covenants
("uniqueness of employee services"), reports the results of a
survey regarding industry practices, and discusses the distinc-
tions between legal enforceability and practical enforcement.
Finally, this Article proposes changes in the law, including
abandonment of the "unique services" rationale and adoption
of specialized standards by which the validity of such contract
provisions should be tested.
I
Commonalities of the Common Law
A. Background
Initially, courts were hostile to post-employment restrictive
covenants. The earliest recorded case, decided in 1414, in-
volved an agreement by a dyer to refrain from practicing his
trade for six months after the termination of his employment
by the covenantee.5 Incensed, the judge refused to issue the
injunction sought by the covenantee, instead declaring that if
the plaintiff was present in court, the judge would imprison
him until the plaintiff paid a fine to the king. For nearly 200
years, case law reflected the belief that these covenants were
restraints of trade and repugnant to public policy. 7 By the
16th century, however, courts were more accepting of such re-
straints, occasionally allowing enforcement if the covenant
4. The author originally intended to compare and contrast the laws of those
jurisdictions containing the country's largest broadcast markets. Research revealed,
however, that there are only minor differences among the many jurisdictions that
apply common law principles to the issue of post-employment non-compete cove-
nants; the more notable distinction is between such jurisdictions and those that have
enacted relevant statutes.
5. The Dyer's Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, pl. 26 (1414).
6. Id.
7. See Handler & Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 721-27 (1982).
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was reasonable in time and geographic scope, and necessary
for the protection of the covenantee 8 Often the justification
for enforcement was based on a freedom of contract rationale:
with modern transportation and decentralization of economic
activity, an individual covenantor could avoid hardship simply
by plying his trade in another location.9
Thus developed the general rule that a contract restraining
trade was valid if it appeared to be reasonable and was sup-
ported by consideration.' ° Indeed, by the late nineteenth cen-
tury, the traditional public policy argument had been
effectively reversed." As one leading commentator noted:
The objections to restraint of trade, namely, that it divests the
promisor of his means of earning a livelihood and of support-
ing himself and family, and that it deprives the community of
the benefit of his services and the benefit which his competi-
tion might offer, are offset by the more important social inter-
est involved in making the goodwill of a business or other
property vendible, or in protecting the covenantee in some
proper interest covered by the contract.'2
Post-employment restrictive covenants of the type thus far
described contemplate and purport to prohibit an individual's
direct competition with a former employer, generally as a rival
entrepreneur. In contrast, the restrictive covenants typically
contained in broadcast talent contracts are intended to restrict
the covenantor from working for a third party who is a com-
petitor of the covenantee. This latter form of restriction de-
veloped, at least in part, from a different seed: negative
covenants prohibiting employees from competing with their
employers during their employment.'i
The famous English case of Lumley v. Wagner 4 provides an
example. Lumley involved a personal services contract under
which opera singer Wagner was to perform exclusively at
Lumley's theater for three months. 5 When it appeared that
8. See id at 727-29.
9. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625, 637-
38 (1982).
10. Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 244, 246
(1928).
11. See id. at 253-54.
12. Id. at 254.
13. See generally Tannenbaum, Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts in
the Entertainment Industry, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 18 (1954).
14. 1 De G.M. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852).
15. Id.
1989]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
Wagner would sing elsewhere during the proscribed period,
Lumley sought specific enforcement of the contract. 6 Ulti-
mately, the court enjoined Wagner from performing else-
where, but declined to force her to sing at Lumley's theatre.'
The intent, and probable impact, of a negative covenant like
the one in Lumley is two-fold. First, its enforcement will tend
to encourage performance of the affirmative obligation by de-
priving the covenantor of alternative employment. This justi-
fication, however, is legally inadequate because it indirectly
attempts to force performance when the law will not do so
directly through an injunction.' A covenantor who is not co-
erced into performing is punished through the resulting in-
come loss.'9
Second, even if the covenantor is not induced to perform,
enforcement of the covenant protects the covenantee from
certain competition. This protection is the more accepted ra-
tionale for enforcement of restrictive covenants.20 Professor
Williston states:
In most of the decisions... the negative undertaking of the
defendant had importance to the plaintiff apart from the pres-
sure which its enforcement would put upon the defendant to
perform his affirmative undertaking, and if the defendant's
performance of his negative obligation has no value to the
plaintiff in itself an injunction will not generally be
granted.... In general, it is not the mere taking of new em-
ployment but unfair competition which equity enjoins.21
The post-employment non-compete covenants found in most
broadcast talent contracts constitute a blend of these two con-
tractual concepts. Like the covenant in Lumley, present day
covenants address the sale of public performance services to a
third party competitor of the covenantee, and, like the earliest
cases (but unlike Lumley), they arise only after the covenan-
tor's employment ends. These covenants are, thus, post-em-
ployment restrictions on "indirect" competition which prevent
an employee from providing services to a third party competi-
tor of the former employer. Under the common law of con-
16. Id
17. Id
18. E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.4 (1982).
19. Id.





tracts, this hybrid, like non-compete covenants in general, is
initially suspect as a restraint of trade.22
A strong presumption of unfairness accompanies post-em-
ployment non-compete covenants because of policy concerns,
such as the superior bargaining power almost invariably
wielded by the employer.23 Nevertheless, as discussed below,
such covenants are frequently enforced.
B. Reasonableness, Divisibility and Modification
According to modern common law interpretation, post-em-
ployment non-compete covenants are enforceable if supported
by consideration and reasonable as to geographic scope, dura-
tion, and range of activities prohibited.2 4 Reasonableness is
evaluated against the backdrop of an ostensibly independent
determination regarding the legitimacy of the business inter-
est the former employer is trying to protect.2 5 Although a mi-
nority of jurisdictions will declare an entire covenant void if
portions of the provision are found unreasonable, 26 many
courts will either partially enforce post-employment non-com-
pete covenants, or modify the offending portions and enforce
the covenants as modified.27 The governing principle is that
partial enforcement must not be "against public policy or...
injurious to the public interest... [or] unnecessarily injurious
to the covenantor, and must not go beyond what is reasonably
necessary to protect the interests of the covenantee. ' '2 1
In determining whether a partially illegal non-compete cov-
enant might be partially enforceable, courts traditionally
looked at the divisibility of the reasonable restrictions from
the excessive restraints imposed by the covenant. This "blue
22. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1979).
23. Id. at § 188 comment g.
24. Id. at § 188 comment d; see, e.g., Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 340
S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. 1960).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1) (1979) provides that a non-
compete covenant is unreasonable if: "(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to
protect the promisee's legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee's need is outweighed
by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public."
26. Annotation, Enforceability, Insofar as Restrictions Would be Reasonable, of
Contract Containing Unreasonable Restrictions on Competition, 61 A.L.R.3d 397, 418
(1975). See also Purcell v. Joyner, 231 Ga. 85, 86-87, 200 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1973); Rec-
tor-Phillips Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, 753, 489 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1973).
27. Annotation, supra note 26, at 410-17.
28. Id. at 408.
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pencil" test became the standard of divisibility: 9
By this rule, the divisibility of a promise in excessive restraint
of trade is determined by purely mechanical means: if the
promise is so worded that the excessive restraint can be elimi-
nated by crossing out a few of the words with a "blue pencil,"
while at the same time the remaining words constitute a com-
plete and valid contract, the contract as thus "blue pencilled"
will be enforced.'0
Although many courts still employ divisibility language, the
"blue pencil" test has virtually been abandoned. 1 In Illinois,
for example, unreasonable restrictions contained within a
post-employment non-compete covenant "may be modified
and enforced to the extent reasonable [as long] as it appears
from the terms of the covenant that the restrictions are sever-
able .... In Statistical Tabulating Corp. v. Hauck,3 the
plaintiff (Statistical) sought to enjoin Hauck from competing
with Statistical in violation of a post-employment non-compete
covenant included in Hauck's employment contract.3 The
trial court granted Statistical's request for a permanent in-
junction against Hauck's business, modifying the covenant,
however, to reduce the proscribed geographical area. 5
The trial court's decision in Hauck clearly demonstrates a
willingness to modify a covenant to make it enforceable.3 '
29. S. WILLISTON, supra note 20, at § 1659.
30. 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1390 (1962).
31. The "blue pencil" test is rejected by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
as "now contrary to the weight of authority." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 184 reporter's note (1979).
32. See Esmarck, Inc. v. McKee, 118 Ariz. 511, 514, 578 P.2d 190, 193 (1978) (ap-
plying Illinois law); see also Statistical Tabulating Corp. v. Hauck, 10 Ill. App. 3d 50,
293 N.E.2d 900 (1973).
33. 10 Ill. App. 3d 50, 293 N.E.2d 900 (1973).
34. The covenant agreed to by Hauck provided:
[I]n consideration of... [his] employment by the corporation... upon ter-
mination of his employment... he would not for two years thereafter...
engage in a business similar or competitive to that of ... [Statistical] within
a radius of 100 miles from any part of 19 other designated cities in various
parts of the United States from California to New York ... or within a
radius of 100 miles from any part of any city in which ... [Statistical] or an
affiliated company was operating at the time his employment was
terminated.
Id at 51, 293 N.E.2d at 901.
35. Id at 52, 293 N.E.2d at 901-02.
36. i, The Appeals Court of Illinois held that the covenant was unreasonable
and that no showing was made as to "possible irreparable injury or grave necessity
for the imposition of restraint by the covenant [even] as modified to afford reason-
able protection to the rights of the employer." Id.
[Vol. 11:423
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Although willing to change a term, however, the Illinois
courts seem unwilling to supply a missing term. In Akhter v.
Shah,37 an Illinois appellate court held that "where the origi-
nal restriction neither provides a time limitation nor clearly
identifies the... [territorial limits] in which the practice is to
be prohibited, the restriction, which is too vague and ambigu-
ous, should not be rewritten by the court. 38
Some jurisdictions have expressly abandoned formal divisi-
bility.3 9 Others employ different principles depending upon
the circumstances involved. For example, New York courts
have held that the divisibility requirement is dependent upon
the nature of the contract.4" In New York, strict (i.e., formal
or technical) divisibility of the contract is required for the
modification of a non-compete clause contained in an agree-
ment for the sale of a business, but is not required in connec-
tion with the modification of such clauses in employment
contracts.4 '
Many courts have adopted the practice of applying stricter
standards to test the enforceability of non-compete covenants
in employment contracts, as distinguished from those in con-
tracts for the sale of a business.' In a further effort to dis-
courage attempts by employers to obtain unjustifiably broad
protection, even those courts willing to modify a non-compete
covenant will generally refuse to do so if they conclude that
the covenant was drafted or included in bad faith.43
1. Geographic Scope
When an express territorial restriction is unreasonably
broad, it can be modified by limiting it to the area in which
the former employee performed duties for his or her former
employer." Some courts have further held that in a case
37. 119 Ill. App. 3d 131, 456 N.E.2d 232 (1983).
38. Id. at 135, 456 N.E.2d at 235.
39. See, e.g., Hill v. Central West Pub. Serv. Co., 37 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1930).
40. See John T. Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, 53 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1931); Consoli-
dated Syrup Corp. v. Kaiser, 22 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1940).
41. Lagomarsino, 53 F.2d at 116.
42. See, e.g., American Hot Rod Assoc. v. Carrier, 500 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1974);
accord C.G. Caster Co. v. Regan, 43 Ill. App. 3d 663, 357 N.E.2d 162 (1976). The
differentiated standard dates back at least to Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P.WMS. 181, 24
Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
43. E. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 363.
44. See Eubank v. Puritan Chemical Co., 353 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962);
Central Keystone Plating of Illinois, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 62 Ill. App. 2d 188, 210
19891
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where there is no express territorial restriction, the prohibi-
tion can be limited to the territory in which the former em-
ployee carried out his duties for the employer,4" or to the
employer's business area.' If the covenant in question is part
of a broadcast talent employment contract, the "employer's
business area" and the "area in which the employee per-
formed duties for his employer" are both generally defined by
the area reached by the broadcast signal (i.e., the "broadcast
market"). Some courts have held that post-employment non-
compete covenants may be limited by judicial modification to
the former employer's customers.47 The "employer's custom-
ers" concept, however, is not particularly useful in relation to
broadcast talent employment contracts. The broadcast em-
ployer's customers are its advertisers, but it is audience share,
not advertisers, that broadcast employers primarily seek to
protect from what they argue is unfair competition.
The geographic reasonableness requirement was applied to a
broadcast talent non-compete provision in Wake Broadcasters,
Inc. v. Crawford.48 In this 1960 Georgia case, the plaintiff
broadcast station was denied an injunction enforcing Craw-
ford's covenant not to engage in radio or television work
within fifty miles of any city in which the plaintiff operated,
despite the fact that the Crawford's broadcasts were aired in
only one broadcast market.49 This covenant was to be effec-
tive for eighteen months after the termination of Crawford's
employment with the plaintiff. The Georgia Supreme Court
said this restriction went far beyond what was necessary to
protect the plaintiff's legitimate business interests and would
cause impermissible hardship to the defendant if he was pre-
vented from working in six states on the mere basis of the
N.E.2d 239 (1965); All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 364 Mass. 773, 308 N.E.2d 481 (1974);
Martin v. Kidde Sales and Services, 496 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
45. See Wrentham Co. v. Cann, 345 Mass. 737, 189 N.E.2d 559 (1963); McAnally v.
Person, 57 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Ct. App. 1933).
46. See Brannen v. Bouley, 272 Mass. 67, 172 N.E. 104 (1930); New England Tree
Expert Co. v. Russell, 306 Mass. 504, 28 N.E.2d 997 (1940); Grace v. Orkin Extermi-
nating Co., 255 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953); Thames v. Rotary Engineering Co.,
315 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958).
47. See Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N.E. 99 (1926); Martin v.
Kidde Sales and Service, 496 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973); Career Placement of
White Plains, Inc. v. Vaus, 77 Misc. 2d 788, 354 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1974); Whiting Milk Co.
v. O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570, 179 N.E. 169 (1931).
48. 215 Ga. 862, 114 S.E.2d 26 (1960).
49. Id at 863, 114 S.E.2d at 28.
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plaintiff corporation's legal presence in those states ° Thus,
the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal'of the plaintiff's
petition for an injunction on the grounds that the restriction
was geographically unreasonable.5 ' The court did not attempt
to modify the restriction to make it enforceable.
Most post-employment restrictions included in broadcast
news employment contracts purport to prohibit competition
within the covenantee's broadcast market. Others define the
proscribed territory in terms of miles, as in Wake Broadcast-
ers. At least one such covenant, banning competition within a
100 mile radius, has been upheld, but the area identified was
not significantly different from the relevant broadcast
market.52
2. Duration
In order to be enforceable, a non-compete covenant gener-
ally must be limited to a reasonable period of time." The du-
ration of a typical post-employment non-compete clause in a
broadcast news talent contract is between three months and
one year,' but at least one court has held that a two year pro-
hibition was reasonable in the case of a radio announcer/sales-
man.55 Five years, however, was found unnecessarily long in
the case of a Boston radio announcer who had already been
away from the proscribed territory for approximately three
years after termination of his employment with the
covenantee.m
3. Range of Activities Prohibited
Under the traditional approach, the third element of the
reasonableness test requires an examination of the range of
activities banned by the covenant. A narrower ban is more
likely to be enforceable than a broader one.57 Arguably, a cov-
50. Id
51. Id
52. Clooney v. WCPO-TV, 35 Ohio App. 2d 124, 300 N.E.2d 256 (1973).
53. See, e.g., Bob Pagan Ford, Inc. v. Smith, 638 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982);
Schmidl v. Central Laundry Supply Co., 13 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1939); Justin Belt Co. v.
Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1973).
54. See infra Section IIIA.
55. Murray v. Lowndes County Broadcasting Co., 248 Ga. 587, 284 S.E.2d 10
(1981).
56. Richmond Bros. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 357 Mass. 106, 256 N.E.2d
304 (1970).
57. See, e.g., Barnes Group, Inc. v. Harper, 653 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1981);
1989]
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enant purporting to ban a former employee's pursuit of an en-
tire occupation, even within a limited geographical area,
should never be enforceable.5 Nevertheless, the post-employ-
ment non-compete covenants typically included in broadcast
news employment contracts almost invariably seek to impose
complete (albeit geographically limited) occupational bans.
Such bans bring into sharp focus the policy issues associated
with non-compete covenants.59
C. Employer's Business Interest
Post-employment restrictive covenants are enforceable only
if they seek to protect a legitimate business interest of the for-
mer employer.60 Traditionally, such interests comprised only
proprietary information, notably trade secrets and customer
lists.6 ' Nevertheless, courts sometimes enforce restrictive cov-
enants on the most rudimentary of contract law principles
(e.g., that the covenant was part of a bargained-for-ex-
change). 62 This approach ignores the public policy against re-
straints of trade, and allows enforcement of covenants even
when the interest for which the former employer seeks pro-
tection is not specified.
The better approach is for the court to require that the em-
ployer show a protectable interest, and then expand the "ap-
proved list" if the employer's legitimate interest is neither
trade secrets nor customer lists. This approach has led to the
addition of a new and problematic consideration-the unique-
ness of an employee's services-to the list of protectable em-
ployer interests.
Increasingly, "uniqueness of employee's services" has been
recognized as a legitimate and protectable interest of the em-
ployer.63  In Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 4 the New
Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 163 W. Va. 420, 431, 257 S.E.2d 885, 891 (1979); Karpinski v.
Ingrasci, 28 N.Y.2d 45, 50, 268 N.E.2d 751, 754 (1971).
58. See generally Closius & Schaffer, supra note 2.
59. See infra section IIIB.
60. See Blake, supra note 9, at 649.
61. See id. Some authors have gone further and argued that "only trade secrets
or confidential information constitute a protectable interest sufficient to justify any
form of post-associational restraint." Closius & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 551 (em-
phasis added).
62. See, e.g., Foster & Co. v. Snodgrass, 333 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838, 844 (D. Conn. 1976).
63. Kniffin, supra note 1, at 26; Tannenbaum, supra note 13, at 21.
64. 40 N.Y.2d 303, 353 N.E.2d 590 (1976).
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York Court of Appeals refused to enforce a restrictive cove-
nant, but suggested that if the employee had rendered unique
services to his employer, the covenant would have been
enforced.65
Purchasing Assocs., Inc. v. Weitz66 illustrates the emergence
of the uniqueness standard as an independent basis for en-
forcement of a post-employment restrictive covenant.
Purchasing Associates, Inc. (Purchasing Associates) was en-
gaged in data processing and hired Weitz for a two year period.
Weitz's employment agreement provided that, for two years
following termination of his employment, he would not com-
pete with his former employer in any area located within
three hundred miles of New York City. The covenant de-
scribed Weitz's services as "special, unique and extraordi-
nary.' '6 7 After one year, Weitz resigned, established his own
company, and began competing within the proscribed geo-
graphic area. Purchasing Associates sought an injunction to
prohibit Weitz from violating the covenant. The New York
Court of Appeals concluded that, although uniqueness could
afford a basis for injunctive relief against the former em-
ployee, Weitz did not in fact perform unique services.6
Although the covenant was not ultimately enforced, the op-
inion is important for two reasons. First, it established
uniqueness of employee services as an independently protect-
able employer interest, rather than merely an additional fac-
tor to be considered in seeking to protect trade secrets or
customer lists. 9 Additionally, the court enunciated a standard
for "uniqueness," explaining that "more must . . . be shown"
than that the individual "excels at his work" or that his serv-
ices are of great value to the employer.7 ° In short, "there must
be a finding that the employee's services are of such character
as to make replacement impossible or that the loss of such
services would cause the employer irreparable injury."71
Other jurisdictions generally purport to apply this stan-
65. Id at 308, 353 N.E.2d at 593.
66. 13 N.Y.2d 267, 196 N.E.2d 245 (1963).
67. Id at 270, 196 N.E.2d at 246.
68. Id, at 274, 196 N.E.2d at 249.
69. Id at 272, 196 N.E.2d at 248.
70. Id at 274, 196 N.E.2d at 249.
71. Id
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dard.72 Unfortunately, the standard has at least two problems.
First, it is not clear, in practice, whether the employee's serv-
ices must be truly unique or just very important to the cove-
nantee. Second, and far more important, even if the services
are unique, "there is no significant correlation between [the]
uniqueness of the employee's services and the reasonableness
of restraining him from accepting employment with a compet-
ing employer. 7
3
The standard's ambiguity is illustrated by Bradford v. New
York Times Co., 7 4 a suit contesting the enforceability of a post-
employment restrictive covenant stipulating the forfeiture of
retirement benefits as liquidated damages. Bradford worked
for the New York Times for 16 years, during which time he
served in various corporate capacities including general man-
ager, vice president, and director. After leaving the New York
Times, Bradford violated the covenant by going to work for a
competitor.75 The New York Times terminated his retirement
benefits, which amounted to approximately one-half million
dollars.76 Bradford sued. The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld the restrictive covenant on the basis of Brad-
ford's uniqueness, which it found inherent in his "broad and
vital corporate responsibilities" and his position as the "No. 2
executive" at the New York Times.77 While the court's posi-
tion has intuitive appeal, the decision is problematic. It may
be assumed that the "No. 2 executive" must have had virtually
unfettered access to proprietary information (e.g., trade secrets
and customer lists), but if the court was protecting proprietary
information, it did not need the uniqueness standard. If it was
protecting some other interest, the court should clearly have
identified that interest.
A more troublesome aspect of protecting an employer's in-
terest in the "uniqueness of employee services" is that the for-
mer employee's skills and abilities, even if developed and/or
enhanced while working for the former employer, belong to
72. Annotation, Enforceability of Covenant Not To Compete Involving Radio or
Television Personality, 36 A.L.R.4th 1139 (1985).
73. Kniffin, supra note 1, at 27.
74. 501 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1974).
75. Id. at 55.
76. Id. at 57 n.3.
77. Id. at 58.
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the employee, not the employers.7  Therefore, they should not
constitute a legitimate basis for the restraint. 9
Moreover, even if the employee's departure causes irrepara-
ble harm to the former employer, enforcement of the negative
covenant will not make the covenantee whole, but will only
punish the covenantor. Punishment is not generally consid-
ered a proper objective of contract law, even in the event of
breach. 0 A fortiori, punishment is an improper objective
when the employment contract has not been breached, but has
merely expired pursuant to its express terms. Nevertheless,
the uniqueness rationale is applied generally* to entertainment
and public performance employment contracts, including per-
sonal services contracts in the broadcast news industry.8 ' It is
particularly troublesome that post-employment non-compete
covenants in broadcast news talent contracts almost invariably
seek to impose complete occupational bans. 2 If, as suggested
above, it is questionable whether the uniqueness of employee
services can reasonably be said to constitute an "employer's
business interest," certainly "uniqueness" should not support
an outright prohibition on the pursuit of an entire occupation,
even within a limited geographical area.
The argument in favor of enforcing post-employment non-
compete covenants in broadcast news talent employment con-
tracts is that such contracts typically run for terms of two to
five years and the marketability of the employee within the
relevant broadcast market at the conclusion of the contract's
term results largely from exposure gained during the term of
the employment contract. The real interest for which the cov-
enantee seeks protection is not the inherent uniqueness of the
covenantor's performance, but the covenantee's investment in
marketing that performance.8 3
78. See, e.g., Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 263 Mass. 223, 227, 160 N.E. 804, 806
(1928).
79. C. KAUFMAN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1391B (Supp. 1984); Hallmark Person-
nel of Texas v. Franks, 562 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978); Club Aluminum Co.
v. Young, 263 Mass. 223, 227, 160 N.E. 804, 806 (1928).
80. E. A. FARNSWORTH, supna note 18, at § 12.8.
81. For citations to cases demonstrating the application of this rule to contracts
involving actors, athletes and other performers, see Tannenbaum, supra note 13, at
nn. 10-20.
82. See sample language excerpted from contracts, infr section IIIA.
83. The inaccuracy of the "uniqueness" label is manifest when an employer has
chosen not to renew the contract of the willing employee, but still wants to preclude
the employee from accepting "competing" employment, or when an employer has
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This concept was illustrated in the 1982 Georgia case of
Beckman v. Cox Broadcasting Corp.84 In Beckman, the Geor-
gia Supreme Court upheld a post-employment restrictive cove-
nant with a duration of 180 days and a territory encompassing
the area within thirty-five miles of the covenantee's offices.
Beckman did not contend that these limits were unreasona-
ble. 5 The issue in this case was whether prohibition of the
broadcast of Beckman's voice or image within the specified
time period and area was unnecessarily broad. In holding for
the broadcasting company, the court expressly considered the
company's significant investment in the development and pro-
motion of Beckman's image in the local broadcast market,
both individually and as a part of the station's "news team."'
Thus, the court found that the company had a protectable
business interest in the former employee's local popularity to
the extent that such popularity resulted from promotional ef-
forts by the company. 7 This approach has the appeal of
candor and affords a rational basis for invoking the otherwise
irrational "uniqueness" factor. As one commentator has
observed:
[T]he loss against which courts protect the employer is... a
loss that begins with the departure of the employee but is
compounded when he assumes a competitive position. If the
employee is truly irreplaceable, then his rendering of services
to a competitor creates a loss .. .which the market system
cannot compensate.8 8
D. Consideration for Employee's Covenant
As with contracts in general, a non-compete covenant must
be supported by consideration to be enforceable. s9 If the non-
compete covenant is executed simultaneously with, and as part
of, an employment contract, the employment itself constitutes
consideration for the covenant. 90 In the majority of jurisdic-
made disparaging remarks about an employee, but then argues that the employee
renders "unique and extraordinary" services. See, e.g., Matuszak v. Houston Oilers,
Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
84. 250 Ga. 127, 296 S.E.2d 566 (1982).
85. Id. at 129, 296 S.E.2d at 568.
86. Id. at 130, 296 S.E.2d at 569.
87. Id.
88. Kniffin, supra note 1, at 54.
89. Annotation, Sufficiency of Consideration for Employee's Covenant Not To




tions, however, mere continuation of employment does not
constitute consideration for a covenant entered into after the
inception of employment. In these jurisdictions new consider-
ation, in the form of additional benefits to the employee, must
be provided by the employer for the covenant to be valid."
Typical benefits include promotions, salary increases, and
annuities.92
A minority of jurisdictions, including Texas, Massachusetts,
Illinois, and New York, find that continued employment is
sufficient consideration for the enforcement of a post-employ-
ment non-compete covenant.93 In McAnally v. Person,' the
Texas Court of Appeals ruled that, although the employee had
worked three months before execution of the covenant, con-
tinued employment was sufficient consideration. 5 Although
continued employment is sometimes held to be sufficient con-
sideration in New York, in Stover v. Gamewell Five Alarm
Telephone Co., I a New York court seemed to take the position
that an annuity contract executed by an employer in favor of
his employee was necessary consideration for the employee's
non-compete covenant entered into after commencement of
employment. 7
E. Present Day Judicial Enforcement
There is a paucity of case law regarding post-employment
non-compete covenants in the broadcast news industry. One
commentator's insights on a similar situation in the entertain-
ment industry aptly describe the problem in the broadcast
news context:
[I]f a dispute arises between an employer and an artist, the
threat of court action is usually sufficient to induce the par-
ties to compromise and settle out of court. Careers in the en-
tertainment field are typically short-lived; if the artist drops
from public view for any length of time his or her career may
be dealt a fatal blow.98
91. Id at 830.
92. Id.
•93. Id. at 828.
94. 57 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Ct. App. 1933).
95. Id. at 948.
96. 149 N.Y.S. 650 (1914).
97. Id. at 652.
98. Grogan, Statutory Minimum Compensation and the Granting of Injunctive
Relief to Enforce Personal Services Contracts in the Entertainment Industries: The
Need for Legislative Reform, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 489, 491 (1964).
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Many post-employment non-compete covenants expressly
state that they are enforceable by injunction. Despite such a
proclamation, courts, and not the parties to a contract, must
determine whether the prerequisites for the issuance of an
injunction have been met. While the parties to a contract may
attempt to provide for an equitable remedy such as liquidated
damages or injunctive relief, such provisions are not binding
upon a court. The alternative remedy is monetary damages
with the associated difficulty of establishing and determining
the extent of injury. Therefore, despite the difficulty of meet-
ing its requirements, the negative injunction is the most
common means of judicial enforcement of personal services
contracts in the broadcast news and entertainment
industries."
An employer attempting to meet the requirements for equi-
table relief is defeated at the outset if unable to show a
probability of success on the merits with respect to the funda-
mental issue: breach of contract. This was the result of a 1968
Florida suit in which the defendant radio commentator had
signed an agreement including a covenant not to compete for
eighteen months following termination of his employment
"for any reason other than discharge without cause."'" Citing
the general policy of opposition to restraints of trade, the
court interpreted the "ambiguous or doubtful language" of the
covenant against its enforcement and concluded that the re-
striction would have been triggered if the defendant had quit
or been fired with cause. Instead, because the contract had
expired by its stated terms, the court held that the covenant
never became effective.10 1
In Richmond Brothers, Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting
Co., 10 2 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed a
trial court's dismissal of a suit by a broadcasting company at-
tempting to enjoin competition by a former employee who had
been absent from the broadcast market for almost three years.
The court did not find the covenant unenforceable, but held
99. Yearn, New Remedial Developments in the Enforcement of Personal Service
Contracts for the Entertainment and Sports Industries: The Rise of Tortious Bad
Faith Breach of Contract and the Fall of the Speculative Damage Defense, 7 Loy.
L.A. ENT. L.J. 27 (1987).
100. Storz Broadcasting Co. v. Courtney, 178 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965), cert denied, 188 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1966).
101. Storz Broadcasting, 178 So. 2d at 42.
102. 357 Mass. 106, 256 N.E.2d 304 (1970).
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that it was unnecessary to enforce the covenant to its full ex-
tent in order to protect the legitimate business interests of the
employer, Richmond Brothers, Inc. (Brothers).0 3
Brothers hired Gerald Jacoby as a radio announcer and
moderator of a talk show on WMEX in Boston. The initial
five year employment contract provided that, for three years
after Jacoby ceased to be employed by Brothers, he would not
engage in the radio, television, or advertising business any-
where in New England. A subsequent employment agreement
between the parties provided Jacoby would not compete with
WMEX for five years after termination of his employment
with Brothers. After Jacoby terminated his employment with
Brothers, he worked in Chicago for three years. He then re-
turned to Boston, where he began broadcasting for Westing-
house's WBZ television and radio stations. Brothers sued to
enforce the covenant by injunction.
The court found the restrictive covenant unreasonably
long."°4 In making this determination, the court looked at the
nature of Brothers' business, the character of the employment
involved, the situation of the parties, the necessity of the re-
striction for the protection of the employer's business, and the
right of the employee to work and earn a livelihood.10 5 After
considering these factors, the court concluded that it was "un-
able to perceive any business interest of [Brothers] which mer-
its the length of 'protection' it would receive by the
enforcement of the covenant."'1 6
The court noted that there was no evidence to indicate that
Brothers had lost any advertisers since Jacoby returned to the
Boston area. Moreover, the court ruled that Jacoby possessed
no trade secrets or other pertinent confidential information
communicated to him during the course of his employment
with Brothers.107 Next, the court rejected Brothers' claim that
Jacoby's immediate success upon his return to Boston was a
direct result of Brothers' expenditures and promotion. The
court found that the reasons for Jacoby's popularity would be
difficult to determine and that, in any case, Jacoby's absence
from the broadcasting area for almost three years sufficiently
103. Id at 111, 256 N.E.2d at 308.
104. Id. at 110, 256 N.E.2d at 307.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 1d at 107, 256 N.E.2d at 305.
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protected Brothers' business interests. 08
The court also stated that an employer cannot prevent an
employee from using skill or intelligence acquired, or in-
creased and improved, through experience or instruction re-
ceived in the course of the employment. Thus, the abilities
possessed by Jacoby were his own, and his efforts to use such
abilities to earn a living could not be restricted to protect
Brothers. The court concluded that enforcement of the cove-
nant beyond the years of Jacoby's absence from Boston would
merely protect Brothers against ordinary competition. 1°9
In KWEL, Inc. v. Prassel,"0 radio station KWEL in Midland,
Texas, hired John Prassel as a radio announcer, and included
a non-compete covenant in his employment contract. Within
several days of his termination by KWEL, Prassel was em-
ployed by radio station KNAM in Midland as an announcer
and producer of commercial announcements. The new job en-
tailed the same kind of work that he had performed at KWEL,
but the stations' formats were different. Prassel acknowl-
edged that he violated the non-compete covenant but denied
that the violation had caused any damage to KWEL. The trial
court found that while at KWEL, Prassel did not have any
selling duties and did not call upon advertising customers."'
Therefore, there was no "customer list" issue. On appeal, the
court held that the terms of the clause were reasonable, but
that KWEL was not entitled to a temporary injunction to bar
the announcer from working for another station because there
was no evidence that KWEL either lost or would lose advertis-
ing customers or audience." 2
American Broadcasting Co. v. Wol, "1 a New York case, in-
volved a complex restrictive covenant and efforts by the
American Broadcasting Company (ABC) to enjoin Warner
Wolf, a sportscaster, from employment with rival CBS. ABC
and Wolf entered into an employment agreement which, fol-
lowing the exercise of a renewal option, was to terminate on
March 5, 1980. The contract included a "good faith negotiation
and first refusal" provision"14 which bound Wolf to negotiate
108. Id. at 111, 256 N.E.2d at 307.
109. Id.
110. 527 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
111. Id.
112. Id at 823.
113. 52 N.Y.2d 394, 420 N.E.2d 363 (1981).
114. The provision reads as follows:
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in good faith with ABC for a ninety-day period from Decem-
ber 6, 1979, through March 4, 1980. Negotiations from Decem-
ber 6th through January 19th were to be exclusively with
ABC. Following expiration of the ninety-day negotiating pe-
riod and the contract on March 5, 1980, Wolf was required,
before accepting any other offer, to afford ABC a right of first
refusal.
Wolf met with ABC in September 1979. At this meeting,
proposals and counter proposals were offered by Wolf and
ABC with no acceptance by either. Subsequently, unbe-
knownst to ABC, Wolf met with representatives of CBS, re-
lated his employment requirements, and discussed the first
refusal and good faith negotiation clause of his ABC contract.
Wolf also furnished a copy of his ABC contract to CBS. On
October 12th and 16th, ABC officials and Wolf met again to no
avail. Finally, on January 2, 1980, ABC agreed to meet sub-
stantially all of Wolf's demands. Wolf rejected the offer. On
February 1, 1980, after termination of the exclusivity period,
Wolf and CBS orally agreed on the terms of Wolf's employ-
ment as a sportscaster for WCBS-TV, a CBS-owned station in
New York. On February 5th, Wolf submitted a letter of resig-
nation to ABC. On February 6th, ABC representatives made
various offers and promises, but Wolf rejected them. Wolf
then informed ABC officials that he had made a "gentlemen's
agreement" with CBS and would leave on March 5th. ABC
filed suit to enjoin Wolf's employment as a sportscaster with
CBS and to seek specific enforcement of its right of first
refusal.
The trial court ruled that there was no breach of contract
You (Wolf] agree, if we so elect, during the last ninety (90) days prior to the
expiration of the extended term of this agreement, to enter into good faith
negotiations with us for the extension of this agreement on mutually agree-
able terms. You [Wolf] further agree that for the first forty-five (45) days of
this renegotiation period, you [Wolf] will not negotiate for your services
with any other person or company other than WABC-TV or ABC. In the
event we are unable to reach an agreement for an extension by the expira-
tion of the extended term hereof, you [Wolf] agree that you will not accept,
in any market for a period of three (3) months following expiration of the
extended term of this agreement, any offer of employment as a sportscaster,
sports news reporter, commentator, program host, or analyst in broadcast-
ing (including television, cable television, pay television, or radio) without
first giving us, in writing, an opportunity to employ you on substantially
similar terms and you agree to enter into an agreement with us on such
terms.
I& at 395, 420 N.E.2d at 364.
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and, in any event, equitable relief would be inappropriate.
The appellate division, although concluding that Wolf had
breached both parts of the good faith negotiation and first re-
fusal provision, nonetheless affirmed on the ground that equi-
table relief was unwarranted."x 5
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that Wolf did not
breach the right of first refusal by accepting an offer during
the term of his employment with ABC, but that Wolf had vio-
lated the good faith negotiation clause of the contract." 6 The
court noted the situations in which injunctive relief could be
granted. First, the court stated that if, in violation of an ex-
isting contract, an employee refuses to render services to his
employer, and the services are unique or extraordinary, an in-
junction may be issued to prevent the employee from using
those services for another person for the duration of the con-
tract, if allowing the employee to work for another employer
would certainly result in irreparable harm to the employer." 7
The second situation in which the court permits injunctive
relief is when the employee has expressly agreed not to com-
pete with the employer following the term of the contract, or
is threatening to disclose trade secrets or commit another tor-
tious act."' Nevertheless, the court noted that, even where
there is an express non-compete covenant, it will be "rigor-
ously examined" and will be specifically enforced only if the
reasonableness requirements of non-compete covenants are
met."
9
The court then acknowledged the general principles regard-
ing enforcement of non-compete covenants and the uniqueness
requirement and refused to grant equitable relief, stating that
Wolf did not violate an express non-compete covenant, and
that such a covenant covering the post-employment period
would not be implied.120 The court made it clear, however,
that Wolf had breached his good faith negotiation obligation,
and that its decision denying equitable relief was without prej-
udice to ABC's right to seek monetary damages.12 1
115. Id at 394, 420 N.E.2d at 363.
116. 1& at 398, 420 N.E.2d at 366.
117. Id at 402, 420 N.E.2d at 367.
118. Id
119. Id
120. Id at 405-06, 420 N.E.2d at 368.
121. Id at 406, 420 N.E.2d at 369.
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The contract provision at issue in Wolf was unusually com-
plex, but it and the other cases discussed in this section serve
to illustrate the uncertainties involved in both the ad hoc de-
termination of what is "reasonable," and efforts to predict
whether equitable relief will be deemed appropriate. More-
over, these vagaries must be contemplated against the back-
drop of the expense and delay of litigation.
II
California's Statute: The Uncommon Law
California courts have not adhered to the reasonableness
test since 1872.122 In 1941, the California legislature enacted a
statute which provides that "every contract by which anyone
is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or
business of any kind is to that extent void."'1 23 The current
statute invalidates most non-compete clauses and, while the
statute's applicability to personal services contracts is settled,
it applies only when a person is restrained from pursuing an
entire trade, business, or profession, but does not prohibit par-
tial restraints. 24 Thus, the statute prohibits the complete "oc-
cupational ban" that is the core of the typical post-
employment non-compete covenant included in a broadcast
news talent employment contract.
California courts have generally upheld post-employment
non-compete covenants limited to a prohibition against the
former employee revealing trade secrets or confidential infor-
mation, such as customer lists. 25 However, if the post-employ-
ment covenant is a general one based on territorial or
122. See Bosley Medical Group v. Abramson, 161 Cal. App. 3d 284, 288, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 477, 480 (1984).
123. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1987). Several other states have simi-
lar, although generally less broad, statutes. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-24 (1958);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1401 (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.12 (West 1972); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:932 (West 1964); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.761 (West
1967); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-807 to 809 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1975);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 217-19 (West 1966); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 53-9-8
to 11 (1967).
124. Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97
Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971); Buskuhl v. Family Life Ins. Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 514, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 602 (1969).
125. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985);
Rigging Int'l Maintenance Co. v. Gwin, 128 Cal. App. 3d 594, 180 Cal. Rptr. 451
(1982).
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durational restrictions, it is generally unenforceable. 6 The
rationale behind the statute and the courts' rulings is that
non-compete covenants are against California's public
policy. 12
7
Trade secrets, customer lists, and other proprietary informa-
tion are protected by other legal principles, including those of
agency. 128 Statutory exceptions exempt sales of businesses and
dissolutions of partnerships from the prohibition.' 29 A non-
compete covenant may be enforceable if it is ancillary to the
sale of a business "whereby the seller covenants not to com-
pete in a specified geographic area for such time as the pur-
chaser or his successor in title continues to carry on that
business.' 3 0  Partners may agree not to compete within the
same city or town in which the partnership transacted busi-
ness.13 Post-employment non-compete covenants are not cov-
126. See Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950), cert denied, 340 U.S. 954
(1951); see also KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 104 Cal. App. 3d 844, 164 Cal. Rptr. 571
(1980).
127. See Fidelity Credit Assur. Co. of Cal. v. Cosby, 90 Cal. App. 22, 265 P. 372
(1928); Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97
Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971).
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(a)-(d) (1957).
129. See Campbell v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford, Jr. University, 817
F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1987).
130. Kniffin, supra note 1, at 35. The specific language of the statutory exception
provides:
Any person who sells the goodwill of a business, or any shareholder of a
corporation selling or otherwise disposing of all his shares in said corpora-
tion, or any shareholder of a corporation which sells (a) all or substantially
all of its operating assets together with the goodwill of the corporation, (b)
all or substantially all of the operating assets of a division or a subsidiary of
the corporation together with the goodwill of such division or subsidiary, or
(c) all of the shares of any subsidiary, may agree with the buyer to refrain
from carrying on a similar business within a specified county or counties,
city or cities, or a part thereof, in which the business so sold, or that of said
corporation, division, or subsidiary has been carried on, so long as the buyer,
or any person deriving title to the goodwill or shares from him, carries on
like business therein. For the purposes of this section, "subsidiary" shall
mean any corporation, a majority of whose voting shares are owned by the
selling corporation.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16601 (West 1987).
131. The specific language provides:
Any partner may, upon or in anticipation of dissolution of the partnership,
agree that he will not carry on a similar business-within a specified county
or counties, city or cities, or a part thereof, where the partnership business
has been transacted, so long as any other member of the partnership, or any
person deriving title to the business or its goodwill from any such other
member of the partnership, carries on a like business therein.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16602 (West 1987).
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ered by these exceptions and, hence, are void in California. 3 2
The reasonableness test applied in most jurisdictions has been
rejected by California courts.3 3
The effect of the California statute is to defeat post-employ-
ment non-compete covenants that are premised upon the uni-
queness of the employee's services. Presumably because of the
statute, there are few California cases concerning post-employ-
ment non-compete covenants included in broadcast news or
other public performance employment contracts. Two cases,
however, serve to illustrate the principle and the limitations of
the prohibition.
KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas'" involved an action seeking to en-
join the defendant from appearing clad in a chicken suit en-
semble after his employment with the plaintiff radio station
had ended. Giannoulas entered into an employment agree-
ment with KGB which provided: "Employee agrees and ac-
knowledges that the costume, concept, and the KGB Chicken
are the exclusive property of employer, and... agrees not to
take any action inconsistent with said rights of employer in
and to the concept of the KGB Chicken."'"
After KGB fired Giannoulas for removing his vest showing
KGB's call letters, Giannoulas began to freelance in a "fowl"
costume without a name. The trial court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction restraining Giannoulas from appearing in a
"chicken suit" at any sports or public event where a team
from San Diego county appeared.
The appellate court found that the prohibition "invalidly re-
strict[ed] Giannoulas' right to earn a living and to express
himself as an artist.' ' 36 The court stated:
Public policy disfavors injunctions restraining the right, to
pursue a calling .... On the national scene, the weight of
authority shows great reluctance to issue restraints unless the
former employer can show irreparable injury. California goes
beyond judicial reluctance to possible illegality of such injunc-
tions .... Although there are a few statutory exceptions to
the ban against restraints of trade, none of them applies ...
132. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985);
Campbell, 817 F.2d at 502. But see Rigging Int'l Maintenance Co. v. Gwin, 128 Cal.
App. 3d 594, 180 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1982).
133. Campbell, 817 F.2d at 502.
134. 104 Cal. App. 3d 844, 164 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1980).
135. Id at 853, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
136. IHi at 847, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
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where the employer seeks to restrain a performer from con-
tinuing to perform after the term of employment expires. i 7
Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp.138 also illustrates the
application of the California statute. In Muggill, the defend-
ants terminated the plaintiff's retirement benefits when, after
leaving defendants' employ, the plaintiff went to work for a
competing business. The Supreme Court of California held
that the termination of Muggill's pension plan was a violation
of the California statute in that it placed a restraint on the
plaintiff's right to engage in a lawful business.3 9 The court
said the statute "invalidates provisions in employment con-
tracts prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor
after completion of his employment or imposing a penalty if
he does so, unless they are necessary to protect the employer's
trade secrets. '140 These decisions leave little doubt that a typi-
cal broadcast news post-employment non-compete covenant
would be flatly unenforceable in California. In jurisdictions
where post-employment non-compete covenants are governed
by common law, the situation is far less clear.
III
Validity of a Typical Post-Employment
Non-Compete Covenant in a Broadcast
Talent Employment Contract
A non-compete covenant in a broadcast talent employment
contract will be enforced "only to the extent that it is reason-
able in time and space, necessary to protect legitimate [em-
ployer] interests, and not an obstruction of the public
interest.' 1 4 1
A. The Reasonableness Test Applied
The following language is typical of post-employment non-
compete covenants commonly included in broadcast talent em-
ployment contracts:
After this contract ends either by expiration or termination,
the newscaster will not make on-the-air appearances on any
137. Id. at 848, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77.
138. 62 Cal. 2d 239, 398 P.2d 147, 42 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1965).
139. Id. at 243, 398 P.2d at 151, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
140. Id. at 242, 398 P.2d at 149, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 22.
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other television or radio station operating within fifty miles of
WXYZ studios for a period of two months for each year the
newscaster was employed by WXYZ or for one year, which-
ever is less. 142
Except in jurisdictions such as California, where a statute
would void this clause, a test of its validity would require
weighing the employer's interest in protecting its business
against the employee's interest in avoiding restrictions on his
ability to earn a livelihood. First, the clause must be reason-
able as to duration, geographic scope and range of activities
prohibited. The cases discussed above indicate that it is likely
a duration of one year and a geographic limitation of fifty
miles would be found reasonable. With respect to the consid-
eration requirement, the non-compete clause, if included in an
initial employment contract, is supported by the commence-
ment of employment. 143
The range of activities prohibited by this sample clause,
however, is extremely broad, banning the former employee's
pursuit of the occupation within the stipulated time period
and area. Whether this prohibition is too broad to be enforced
can only be determined with reference to the business interest
which the former employer seeks to protect: the uniqueness
of employee services. In the broadcast news context, as dis-
cussed above, "uniqueness" is often a euphemism for the em-
ployer's investment in the employee's popularity.
Nevertheless, "uniqueness" is the rubric under which cove-
nants of this type are most often enforced.
Because of the difficulty in showing uniqueness, broadcast
talent employment contracts sometimes include "unique serv-
ices" clauses to bolster the enforceability of non-compete cove-
nants.4 Yet, despite the best efforts of broadcast employers'
142. Litwin, Negotiating Media Contracts: Personal Service Contracts for On-Air
Talent, 31 BOSTON B.J. 14, 16-17 (1987).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 89-97.
144. The following language comprises a typical "unique services" clause:
The services to be furnished by the newscaster hereunder and the rights
granted by the newscaster hereunder are of a special character that gives
them a unique value, the loss of which cannot be adequately or reasonably
compensated for in damages in an action at law. The newscaster's failure to
meet the obligations described in this agreement will cause the station ir-
reparable injury or damage for which the station will be entitled to seek
and obtain injunctive or other equitable relief. The granting of such relief
will not, however, be construed as a waiver of any other rights the station
may have against the newscaster in law or in equity.
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lawyers, no formal recitation by the parties to the contract
will ever bind a court to the conclusion asserted therein. As
one court stated, "in a court proceeding, the contractual recital
regarding uniqueness of services may be admitted as evidence,
to be weighed against the performer's affidavit to the con-
trary." '145 Generally, employers will need to provide further
evidence of the unique nature of employee's services.'4 Mere
contractual recitals of uniqueness will not stand against the
court's own finding to the contrary. 47
The focus on "uniqueness" and how to prove it misses the
point. The business interest for which the former employer
seeks protection is not any inherent uniqueness in the services
rendered by the former employee. These services, after all,
are far more like those of other broadcast talents than they
are different. Rather, the employer seeks to protect its invest-
ment in the employee's audience popularity within the broad-
cast market. This fact is implicitly acknowledged in many
"unique services" clauses, which make the duration of the pro-
hibition dependent on the length of employment. Another
measure of the former employer's investment in the former
employee is the former employee's position in the employer's
hierarchy, often indicated by salary.
Bradford v. New York Times Co.,'4 s while not based on a
broadcast news employment contract, nevertheless illustrates
the use of employee importance, rather than uniqueness, as a
basis for enforcing a post-employment non-compete covenant.
The Bradford court found a protectable employer interest in
the mere fact that Bradford had occupied a high position in
the New York Times organization.149  The court simply
equated high position with unique services."s In addition, it is
at least possible that Bradford's high salary persuaded the
court, if only intuitively, that the New York Times had, in ef-
fect, "purchased" the covenant. 15 ' The seeming pro-employer
Litwin, supra note 142, at 17.
145. KWEL, Inc. v. Prassel, 527 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
146. Id See also Harry Rogers Theatrical Enterprises, Inc. v. Comstock, 232
N.Y.S. 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928).
147. Id. See, e.g., Fredrick Bros. Artists Corp. v. Yates, 186 Misc. 871, 61 N.Y.S.2d
478 (1946), rev'd, 271 N.Y. 69, 62 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1946); Dockstader v. Reed, 121 N.Y.
846, 106 N.Y.S. 795 (1907).
148. 501 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1974); see also supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
149. 501 F.2d at 58.
150. Id
151. Closius & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 550.
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bias of this rationale in the employment contract context has
led some critics to propose the use of other legal principles,
such as those of agency and fiduciary responsibility:
Using contract rules to evaluate a covenant's validity permits
the courts to enforce occupational bans that give more protec-
tion from competition to [an employer's] interests than is le-
gitimately justified. 2
The restrictive covenants typically used by broadcast compa-
nies are vulnerable to challenges of at least two types. First, it
can be argued that a particular covenant is unreasonable,
either in part or in its entirety. The more fundamental attack
challenges, on policy grounds, the validity of post-employment
non-compete covenants in general. The latter challenge is not
likely to succeed in states that have not enacted statutes curb-
ing the use of such covenants, but even a court unwilling to
engage in "judicial legislation" might find the policy argu-
ments an adequate basis for heightened scrutiny with respect
to reasonableness and the employer's business interest.
B. Policy Considerations
1. Public Interest
The policy arguments against enforcement would seem es-
pecially persuasive when an employer has terminated an em-
ployee or is using a post-employment restriction to pressure an
employee not to quit. In the latter instance, one court has
observed:
A covenant that serves primarily to bar an employee from
working for others or for himself in the same competitive
field so as to discourage him from terminating his employ-
152. I at 548. Closius and Schaffer propose that the common law rules of agency
and unfair competition, rather than the rules of contract, should govern the enforce-
ability of post-employment non-compete covenants. Id at 532-35. Their position is
that, generally, only trade secrets, customer lists, and the like constitute legitimately
protectable employer business interests and that contract law, correctly applied, adds
nothing to the protection afforded by agency and related legal principles. Id at 548.
The Second Restatement of Agency provides that the agent may continue to use
personal skills, including those acquired or honed during the course of the agency, as
well as generally known or available information regarding the business. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(b)-(d) (1957).
The potential utility of this argument in the context of broadcast news employ-
ment contracts, however, is undercut by Closius and Schaffer themselves, who
would make an exception for an employee "with acknowledged expertise and repu-
tation within an industry who fills a significant position within the [employer's] busi-
ness," and who "possesses bargaining power equal to that of the [employer]."
Closius & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 550.
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ment is a form of industrial peonage without redeeming vir-
tue in the American economic order.153
The court's reference to the "economic order" shifts the focus
away from fairness to the individual, and sounds the theme of
social utility-a theme that runs through much of the policy
discussion regarding post-employment non-compete covenants.
The question then becomes whether society is better off with
the enforcement of restrictive covenants in a particular indus-
try or business.
It can be argued that the public interest is best served by
the enforcement of at least some post-employment non-com-
pete covenants because they protect, and therefore encourage,
employer investment, which results in better products and
services. It would be extremely difficult, however, to demon-
strate this proposition in broadcast news, where it is unclear
what "better" means or how it can be measured.
The public interest argument against enforcement is also
largely economic. The court in Reed, Roberts Assocs. v.
Straumanlm described the economic system's need for "the
uninhibited flow of services, talent and ideas''15 and went on
to state that "no restrictions should fetter an employee's right
to apply to his own best advantage the skills and knowledge
acquired by... his previous employment."'1
The potentially significant collective economic impact of
post-employment non-compete restraints has led many au-
thors to advocate application of the rules and principles of an-
titrust law to the covenants.'57 The Sherman Antitrust Act
proscribes "every contract in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states.' 5 ' This seemingly absolute prohibi-
153. Josten's, Inc. v. Cuquet, 383 F. Supp. 295, 299 (E.D. Md. 1974).
154. 40 N.Y.2d 303, 353 N.E.2d 590 (1976).
155. Id. at 307, 353 N.E.2d at 593.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Step-chil& A Proposal for Deal-
ing with Restrictive Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 CoLuM. L. REV. 1193, 1204
(1973); Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust Treatment of Post-
Employment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The commerce clause of the Constitution has long been
construed as giving Congress significant power over not only interstate activities, but
also intrastate labor-management relations. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 117-24 (1941); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-32
(1937). Also, although 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976) states that human labor is not a com-
modity or article of commerce, this definition was developed to create room (within
the antitrust arena) for labor unions to operate legally. Nichols v. Spencer Int'l
Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1967).
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tion has long been tempered,* however, by the "rule of rea-
son."' 9 Perhaps as a result, every post-employment restraint
tested under the rule has survived.16°
In Newburger, Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Gross, 161 for example, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals observed that "employee
agreements not to compete are proper subjects for scrutiny
under section 1 of the Sherman Act."'1 2 In concluding that
the restriction at issue was reasonable, and therefore enforcea-
ble, the court cited the covenantee's "legitimate interest" in
preventing the covenantor from competing for customers of
the covenantee.1l 3
Newburger involved a securities brokerage firm, rather than
a broadcasting company, but nevertheless demonstrates that
an antitrust analysis ultimately tests the covenant against a
standard not appreciably different from the previously dis-
cussed standard for non-compete covenants under basic con-
tract law-the test of reasonableness. 1 Arguing that the
economic issues remain relevant, however, noted antitrust
159. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57-60 (1910) (acknowledging
that every contract restrains trade and, therefore, the prohibition cannot be
absolute).
160. See, e.g., Bradford v. New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1974);
Frackowiak v. Farmer Ins. Co., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1309, 1318-19 (D. Kan. 1976); Alders
v. A.F.A. Corp. of Fla., 353 F. Supp. 654, 656 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Miller v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1296, 1297 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
At least one author has argued that the survival of the restrictions under antitrust
analysis results from the courts' failure to consider labor market impact, as opposed
to product market impact. Product market analysis is the traditional approach, but
labor market analysis has been employed in some sports cases. Note, The Antitrust
Implications of Employee Non-compete Agreements: A Labor Market Analysis, 66
MINN. L. REV. 519 (1982) (citing Radovich v. N.F.L., 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957);
Mackey v. N.F.L., 543 F.2d 606, 616-18 (8th Cir. 1975), cert dismissed, 434 U.S. 801
(1977)).
161. 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977).
162. I& at 1082.
When a company interferes with free competition for one of its former
employee's services, the market's ability to achieve the most economically
efficient allocation of labor is impaired .... Morever, employee-noncompe-
tition clauses can tie up industry expertise and experience .... Restraints
on postemployment competition that serve no legitimate purpose at the
time they are adopted would be per se invalid .... Even if the clause is not
overbroad per se, it might still be scrutinized for unreasonableness: Are the
restrictions so burdensome that their anticompetitive purposes and effects
outweigh their justifications? Restraints that fail this balancing test might
be struck down under a rule of reason.
163. Id, at 1082-83.
164. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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scholar Professor Sullivan has suggested that "the courts
should take into account market impact in a more explicit and
more serious manner than they have so far."5 He advocates
a five-factor analysis for evaluation of post-employment non-
compete covenants: (1) the totality of the anti-competitive re-
straints imposed by the employer involved and not merely
those of one plaintiff; (2) the extent to which there is a pat-
tern of such restraints in the relevant industry; (3) the state of
competition in the industry, generally, and in the relevant geo-
graphic market; (4) the scope of the restraint's prohibition and
the remedy provided in the contract for noncompliance; and
(5) the nature of the employee restrained, with special disfa-
vor for restraints on employees who are particularly valuable
to competitors. Additionally, Professor Sullivan suggests that
courts subject proffered employer justifications to a higher de-
gree of scrutiny.16 6
2. Individual Rights
A second and distinct set of policy questions concerns the
applicability and impact of the concept of individual rights.
Beneath the simplicity of the phrase "freedom of contract" is
the conflict between the sanctity of one contract (here, an
agreement not to compete) and an individual's freedom to
make a second contract (for the sale of one's personal serv-
ices). Indeed, freedom of contract is a misnomer if what is
meant is that parties should be free to agree on whatever
terms they like, and that the state, through its judicial appara-
tus, should enforce those agreements. Reality is neither so
simple nor so absolute.
Judicial refusal to enforce contracts involving fraud, duress
or incapacity, for example, is at once a prerequisite of, and an
exception to, freedom of contract. 167 It is a prerequisite be-
cause freedom of contract is generally thought to be meaning-
ful only when parties with contractual capacity act
voluntarily. 6  Even when these conditions are met, however,
the parties are not entirely free to do as they please, for the
165. Sullivan, supra note 157, at 647.
166. Id. at 647-49
167. Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41
MD. L. REV. 563, 569-70 (1982). Professor Duncan Kennedy describes this as "the




doctrines of undue influence and unconscionability give courts
broad latitude to adjust or avoid otherwise valid agreements. 169
One difficulty in applying the doctrine of unconscionability
to employment contracts in broadcast news is that the doc-
trine is most often invoked in situations involving unequal
bargaining power.17 0 A relatively well-paid broadcast newsper-
son may not appear to need this particular type of protection.
Perhaps the real issue is the difficulty of protecting the em-
ployee from his or her own willingness to enter into a bad bar-
gain.171  Blatantly paternalistic treatment of highly-paid,
skilled, professional adults may seem ill-conceived, but there
is abundant precedent for this in legislation regarding
mandatory use of seat belts, the social security system, and the
federal system of securities regulation. The question is
whether the prospective freedom to sell one's services is an
interest whose alienation the law should regulate, or even for-
bid. 7 2 The idea that freedom to ply one's trade is an interest
"owned" by each individually is neither radical nor novel.173
To conclude that this interest should be inalienable, however,
requires a second, more difficult step. Prohibitions against
selling oneself into slavery or agreeing to be murdered are
scarcely controversial, but the analogy to an agreement not to
do a particular kind of work in a particular area during a par-
ticular period of time seems wholly theoretical and quite at-
169. Id
170. Id. at 614-15. See also U.C.C. § 2-302 comment (1978) (on unconscionability).
"The principle is one of the prevention of oppression." Id
171. Kennedy, supra note 167, at 634. "Courts using the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility like to put their decisions on grounds of unequal bargaining power ... [b]ut it's
often obvious that they are concerned not with power but with naivete." Id
172. See generally Calebresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972). There are
three types of "entitlements": those protected by property rules, those protected by
liability rules, and those that are inalienable. "An entitlement is inalienable to the
extent that its transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing
seller." Id. at 1092-93.
173. See J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. V (P. Laslett rev. ed.
1963). "Every Man has a Property in his own Person .... The Labour of his Body
and the Work of his Hands... are properly his." Id. at § 27 (emphasis in original).
See also J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112 (R. Hildreth trans. 4th ed. 1882)
("The idea of property consists in an established expectation."); Lynch v. Household
Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1971) ("[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties
and property rights is a false one .... In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists
between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither
could have meaning without the other."). See generally Radin, Property and Per-
sonhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
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tenuated 7 4 There would be little basis for objection if, during
the period of restraint, the covenantor was paid not to work.
This differs from the typical situation, however, only because
in the typical situation the covenantor is, arguably, paid in ad-
vance not to work during the period of the restraint.
Despite these difficulties with the individual rights argu-
ment, it seems likely that the California statute is motivated,
at least in part, by related concerns. This would tend to ex-
plain the California statute's exception for sales of businesses
and dissolutions of partnerships. Presumably, additional sup-
port for the statutory prohibition came from concerns regard-
ing efficiency and social utility which were, perhaps, merely
intuitive. These issues are difficult to specify and still more
difficult to assess empirically.1 7 5
IV
Enforcement: the Practice in the Industry
The results of a recent informal survey conducted by the au-
thor afford some insight into the practices of television sta-
tions in this country's top broadcast markets with respect to
post-employment non-compete covenants. 7 ' Nearly all (96%)
of the stations responding to the survey have written employ-
ment agreements with most of their on-air talent. The great
majority of these stations (80%) use a "standard form" con-
tract to define the relationship. The written talent contracts
employed by 76% of the stations "always" include post-em-
ployment non-compete covenants; nearly all the remaining
stations require such covenants "sometimes."
Of the stations that use post-employment non-compete cove-
nants, the duration of these covenants ranged from thirty days
to one year. For news anchors, the most common (60%) dura-
tion of restriction was one year. For reporters, one year re-
strictions were also most common (50%), but six month
174. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 172, at 1113-15 & nn. 45-51.
175. The legislative history of, and cases interpreting the California statute say
little more than that restraints on otherwise lawful employment are violative of Cal-
ifornia's public policy. See, e.g., supra notes 122-40 and accompanying text.
176. As part of the research for this Article, the author mailed a written question-
naire (and a duplicate follow-up to non-respondents) to the news directors of com-
mercial broadcast television stations in the country's top twenty broadcast markets.
Seventy-nine questionnaires were mailed; thirty-six responses were received. Survey
results are available from the author and at COMM/ENT.
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restrictions were not unusual (30%). Regarding geographical
scope, all but two respondents indicated that the restrictions
employed by their stations prohibited competition within the
immediate broadcast market. One news director indicated
that his station uses contract language prohibiting post-em-
ployment competition within a 100 mile radius. Another indi-
cated that his station attempts to prohibit competition within a
75 mile radius.
Approximately one-half of the respondents indicated that
they or their stations had sought to enforce post-employment
non-compete covenants. More than 90% of these efforts were
successful. Most (64%) of the successful efforts reportedly in-
volved litigation. One respondent indicated that his station
had twice used litigation to delay resolution of the issue be-
yond the period of the restriction and then reached a settle-
ment. A slight majority of the responding news directors
indicated that they thought post-employment non-compete
covenants were valuable because they were legally enforcea-
ble. 77 A smaller, but significant, group (21%) indicated that
they thought the covenants were "valuable because employees
voluntarily abided.' 178 Still smaller groups of respondents in-
dicated that they thought the covenants were "valuable be-
cause employers enforce them by 'gentlemen's agreement'"
(15%), or "not valuable" (6%). 179
The paucity of case law resulting from efforts to enforce
post-employment non-compete covenants in broadcast talent
contracts may result from "the uncertain state of the law with
respect to the circumstances in which prohibitory injunctions
may be granted or denied [making] both the artist and the em-
177. Respondents who indicated that they thought post-employment non-compete
covenants were valuable because they were legally enforceable included one news
director at a California station. However, such covenants are clearly unenforceable
in California. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
178. While it is possible that employees voluntarily abide because they believe
that the non-compete covenants are fair, it is also possible that many employees
think that the covenants are unfair and even unenforceable. The principal problem
with ad hoc determinations of what is "reasonable" is that this approach makes liti-
gation virtually inevitable in the event of a dispute. Therefore, employees, who typi-
cally have fewer resources than employers, are likely to abide simply because they
are effectively intimidated. Cf Sullivan, supra note 157, at 622-23.
179. With respect to this inquiry, the combined percentages exceed 100% because
respondents were invited to check as many responses as accurately reflected their
views. One respondent indicated that he or she thought the covenants were valuable
because they were legally enforceable, but added a question mark.
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ployer wary of waging an appellate court case at considerable
expense." 180  The burden of this uncertainty weighs more
heavily upon the employee, though, because the employer is
almost certain to have superior resources. Thus, "[f]or every
covenant that finds its way into court, there are thousands
which exercise an in terrorem effect on employees .... "181
Judicial enforcement of post-employment non-compete cove-
nants is less frequent in the broadcast news industry than is
voluntary compliance by covenantors and potential employers
who decline to hire them.
In other contexts, voluntary compliance with unenforceable
contract provisions often results from an erroneous belief in
judicial enforceability. In this instance, however, it appears
that the players (employers, employees, and potential employ-
ers) comply not because they are unaware of, for example,
the California statute, but because of extrajudicial enforce-
ment, or the fear of it.
Such extrajudicial enforcement is accomplished primarily in
two ways: through an unspoken agreement among employers
in the broadcast industry that they will not "raid each other's
shops"; and through the fears of employees that their reputa-
tions, and hence marketability, will be jeopardized if they fail
to honor agreements into which they have knowingly entered.
The anti-shop-raiding consensus among employers is based on
a well-founded belief that the non-compete covenant may be
the only protection that employers have against greatly inten-
sified salary competition for talent. The demise of non-com-
pete covenants might, under certain conditions, unleash a
virtual price war, which would benefit talent but would proba-
bly do employers, as a class, more harm than good. In addi-
tion, in the background lurks the possibility that hiring an
employee in violation of the post-employment non-compete
covenant could subject a subsequent employer to tort liability
for intentional interference with business relations. l 2
180. Grogan, supra note 98, at 492.
181. Blake, supra note 9, at 682.
182. See, e.g., Gorman Publishing Co. v. Stillman, 516 F. Supp. 98, 106 (N.D. Ill.
1980). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766-774A (1977) (discus-
sion of intentional interference with contractual relationships).
Of course, an employee-covenantor willing to undertake the expense of litigation
may attempt to assuage the fears of prospective employers by seeking a declaratory
judgment. For example, Clooney v. WCPO TV Div. of Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 35 Ohio App. 2d 124, 300 N.E.2d 256 (1973), involved a television personality who
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The employee must consider not only the possibility of be-
ing shunned by the fraternity of broadcast news employers,
but also the high cost of litigation and the very real possibility
that the final determination of even eventually successful liti-
gation might not occur until after the post-employment re-
striction has expired. "While taking each case on its merits is
an appealing approach, it is an approach which tends to place
litigation expense burdens on defendants (former employees)
who as a class are frequently not in an economic position to
test their rights.'11 3 Ultimately, therefore, post-employment
non-compete covenants are likely to be effective, whether ju-
dicially enforceable or not, because of the functional intimida-
tion born of grossly unequal resources.1
V
Alternative Proposals
The burden resulting from the confused state of the law re-
garding non-compete covenants is borne disproportionately by
employees who, with inferior resources, often must undertake
expensive litigation to secure, or even ascertain, their rights.
In order to address this problem, the law should be made clear
and, ideally, uniform. Alternative approaches to clarification
of this area of the law are discussed below.
A. Statutory Prohibition
The straightest path to clarity and uniformity would be the
enactment by each jurisdiction in the United States of legisla-
tion similar to that adopted in California.18 5 Presumably, most
employers would oppose such a wide-reaching prohibition on
post-employment non-compete covenants. Although it might
be difficult for these employers to show that California's stat-
ute has caused actual loss to California employers, the success
hosted a one hour program five days per week. His employment contract included a
one year post-employment restriction prohibiting competition within 100 miles of
WCPO. Id at 125, 300 N.E.2d at 257. The contract also stated that Clooney's services
were "special, unique, unusual, [and of an] extraordinary" character. Id. Upon leav-
ing WCPO, Clooney sought a declaratory judgment that the restriction was unen-
forceable. Ultimately, the restriction was upheld on the basis that its provisions
were reasonable given Clooney's "unique services." Id. at 126-28, 300 N.E.2d at 258-
59.
183. Milgnzm on Trade Secrets, 12 Bus. Org. (MB) 3-121 (1988).
184. Blake, supra note 9, at 682-88.
185. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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of extrajudicial enforcement in California may largely be at-
tributable to judicial enforceability elsewhere, and effective
nationwide prohibition of post-employment non-compete cove-
nants would soon unravel the scheme of extrajudicial enforce-
ment. Although this is probably true, a scheme based largely
upon intimidation and disproportionate power arguably should
be unraveled.
B. Statutory Regulation
Legislatures unwilling to prohibit post-employment non-
compete covenants that are premised upon the uniqueness ra-
tionale might consider the less extreme step of statutory regu-
lation. Either or both of two requirements could be imposed.
1. Minimum Compensation
A post-employment non-compete covenant premised upon
the uniqueness rationale could, by statute, be made enforcea-
ble only if the employee in question is highly paid. Statuto-
rily-specified minimum compensation would reduce the
number of post-employment restrictions employers seek to
impose and simultaneously ensure that the restrictions that
were imposed would affect only employees in whom the em-
ployer had made a more substantial investment. In addition,
statutory minimum compensation as a condition to the en-
forceability of post-employment non-compete covenants would
increase the likelihood that contesting employees would be
able to afford legal assistance.
The above proposition finds support in that, although appar-
ently not applicable to post-employment restrictions, one Cali-
fornia statute establishes minimum annual compensation as a
prerequisite to the grant of an injunction to prevent the
breach of a personal services contract. 86
186. The general rule in California is that personal services contracts cannot be
specifically enforced. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3390 (Deering 1984). There is an exception,
however, and thus injunctions may be granted to prevent the breach of such con-
tracts which are "in writing ... where the minimum compensation for such service
is at the rate of not less than six thousand dollars per annum and where the prom-
ised service is of a special, unique, unusual, extraordinary or intellectual character,
which gives it peculiar value .... " Id at § 3423(5). See also CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 526(5) (West 1979). The $6,000 figure was adopted in a 1919 amendment. CAL. CIv.
CODE § 3423(5). It is now absurdly low, but has not been subsequently amended;




It is suggested throughout this Article that the only legiti-
mate employer's interest in the "uniqueness" of a broadcast
news employee's services is the employer's investment in pro-
moting (advertising) the employee. This fact should be explic-
itly and statutorily acknowledged in legislation that need not
be limited to the broadcast news industry. This proposition is
not unprecedented: a Louisiana statute declares void any non-
compete agreement that the employer may "require or direct
any employee to enter into." However, such a restriction may
be enforceable if it does not exceed two years, and if "the em-
ployer incurs an expense in the training of the employee or
incurs an expense in the advertisement of the business.... "187
Legislation following this model should make clear that the
expense incurred must be substantial. Also, it should be made
clear that the referenced advertisement must connect the em-
ployee-covenantor with the business.18
C. Common Law Clarity and Candor
The approach least likely to produce uniformity and predict-
ability is the present common law system of ad hoc determina-
tion of the restriction's reasonableness. Nevertheless, this
system could be greatly improved if courts making these de-
terminations would be clear and candid about the employer's
business interest and the economic issues (e.g., potential mar-
ket impact). A more precise focus on these issues would allow
the underlying policy considerations to guide the development
of this area of law in a rational direction and, hence, toward a
greater degree of clarity and predictability.
Conclusion
Most radio and television personalities are willing to sign
employment contracts including post-employment non-com-
pete covenants because of the compensation promised in the
contract.189 As a result, post-employment non-compete cove-
187. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West 1985).
188. Louisiana courts have so construed the Louisiana statute. See Nalco Chemi-
cal Co. v. Hall, 237 F. Supp. 678, 681 (E.D. La. 1965), qff'd, 347 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1965).
189. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text. See also Litwin, supra note
142.
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nants are quite common in broadcast talent contracts.19° Judi-
cial enforcement of the covenants is unacceptably
unpredictable, however, and extrajudicial enforcement makes
a mockery of the law.
The principal problem with judicial enforcement is the am-
biguity and questionable relevance of the "unique services" ra-
tionale. In the broadcast news context, this rationale should
be abandoned in favor of an examination of the extent to
which the employer has invested in the local marketability of
the employee.
The surest path to greater consistency is statutory reform.
Prohibitions such as the California statute, however, may only
serve to increase instances of extrajudicial enforcement. A
compromise solution should link enforceability to employer
investment and minimum compensation.
190. Litwin, supra note 142, at 17.
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